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Introduction
Over the last few decades the basic structure of
the programmes focussing on agriculture has
changed in the majority of the European Union
(EU) countries. The original stimuli for these
programmes included the need to support
incomes in rural areas during the depression of
the 1930’s and the desire to increase agricultural
production after World War II. In the 21st
century, the needs of agriculture are fundamentally
different and agricultural policy requires
reviewing (e.g. [5]).
Agriculture has always been the EU’s
largest policy area in budgetary terms. Although
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has
been the subject of incremental reforms since
the mid-1980s [16], a radical examination of
this policy is still a relatively irregular matter and
the EU Member States are still wavering with
respect to undertaking fundamental reforms in
their agricultural policy. For a long time,
European politicians have assumed contradictory
positions concerning the restructuring of
agriculture.
Ever since the establishment of the CAP,
two opposing opinions have become apparent
[23]. The first opinion enforces measures
aimed at accelerating the structural changes in
agriculture that will lead to an increase in
productivity and prepare the way for a gradual
removal of subsidies for farmers, thereby creating
savings. The second opinion, with mercantile
tendencies, supports the continuation of state
subsidies in order to ensure the survival of
a large number of farmers in the sector.
Lowe et al. [16] note two alternative
conceptions that have competed for influence
in determining the evolution of the CAP since
the 1980s. Market liberalism stresses reductions
in commodity prices and the removal of export
support to open up the European agricultural
market to world trade. Protectionism protests
that such moves would disadvantage farm
communities across the EU and thereby resists
further CAP reforms. Between these two
visions, a European model of agriculture has
emerged, that highlights an important feature of
agriculture, that being its multi-functionality.
The concept of multi-functionality creates
a different emphasis from that of just the
production function of agriculture which is in
decline [8]. This includes maintaining rural
landscapes and the environment and the social
role of maintaining support for inhabitants in
peripheral areas.
An important element in the process of
reforming agricultural policy is the agricultural
lobby. Its firm standing in the EU has had a not
inconsiderable influence on efforts to bring
about a liberal form of the CAP. As an inter-
national political project, the liberalisation of
agriculture is greatly encumbered, by resistance
to liberalisation being primarily based on fears
stemming from the threats of the multi-
functionality of agriculture and its abilities to
bring about environmental and social welfare [8].
On the basis of the above – mentioned
facts, the objective of the paper is to identify
what role the agricultural lobby plays in the
process of reforming agricultural policy and
why it has such a strong position despite the
fact that the importance of agriculture in the EU
is in decline and EU agricultural policy is
primarily criticised for its high costs and low
efficiency. Based on the comparative analysis
of the key papers in the area of agricultural
policy and agricultural lobby and the case study
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illustrating mediating interests in the Czech
Republic we will demonstrate why reforms of
agricultural policy are so difficult and where the
power of agricultural lobby as the interest group
resides.
1. The Agricultural Lobby as an
Example of an Interest Group
The literature surrounding the public choice
theory points out that a competitive market
needs a government to establish and control
property rights, to see that contractual conditions
are upheld, to put criminals outside the law and
to regulate the currency (e.g. [2]). Government
is also used to correct inequities created by the
market and thus it becomes endogenous within
the political/economic system [10]. With an
endogenous government used to remove
failures in market mechanisms, intervention
policies are traditionally aimed at producers that
would otherwise fall behind in a competitive
market.
Whilst the scope of government subsidies
for producers rather than consumers depends
on the degree of democracy, there are three
basic conditions that determine the strength of
the pressure to support intervention [10]. Firstly,
the more the sector (for instance agriculture) is
subject to an unavoidable relative decline in
importance as a result of economic development,
the greater the pressure for support and
protection. Political support for political redistribution
measures depends on the income per
inhabitant and the extent of the redistributed
incomes. These attributes are precisely shown
by subsidies aimed at the agricultural sector.
Secondly, the more the production sector is
connected with the sympathies of the voter
base and the more important the sector’s
products are for survival and prosperity, the
more likely it is that government support for
such a sector will follow. The third condition
states that the smaller the sector, the greater
the profits producers can gain from the political
persuasion associated with manipulating
a competitive market. Owing to the fact that
production essentially involves specialisation,
producers will be more likely to concentrate
their efforts than consumers. This leads to the
fact that the producers’ profits from market
protection exceed consumers’ and tax payers’
losses that arise as a result of the protection.
Thus, producers devote greater efforts when
persuading the political system about their
merits than consumers and tax payers invest in
resistance to such protection. It is clear that this
condition emerges from the reinterpretation of
the logic of collective action by Olson [22].
The amount of support also depends on the
willingness of payers to bear the costs. The
faster the economic growth, the greater are the
differences between agriculture and the rest of
the economy and thus the willingness of the
rest of the economy to support agriculture is
greater. Moreover, the transition of an economy
from agricultural to industrial leads to strong
pressure to support agriculture and market
intervention.
Thus, the liberalisation of agriculture depends
on a successful decline in the importance and
voter strength of the agricultural sector and its
sympathisers and a balancing out of its natural
political advantages. Strong elements supporting
the liberalisation of agriculture are also
sustainable economic development, distancing
itself from its agricultural roots, and the
sustainable development and modernisation of
the agricultural sector. More about neolibe-
ralisation and the state can be found in [13].
The greater the level of subsidies and the
longer their history, the more dependent
farmers are on the level of subsidies and the
greater is their resistance to their removal [17].
According to Olson [22] group theory shows that
the more coherent and organised a group is and
the more significant the threat to its welfare, the
more resistant it is to political reforms.
Mueller [19] divides legislation into public
goods with characteristics that appeal to
a given group of voters or to income transfers
from one section of the population to another.
The transfers can represent a tax relief
favouring a certain group, together with an
increase in the average tax rate, which serves
to replace the tax revenues lost by virtue of the
tax relief. Income can be transferred from one
group to another by other, more subtle means.
For instance, the government may wish to help
form, improve or protect the monopolistic position
of the groups. This increases the monopolistic
rent of the favoured groups at the expense of
those that buy goods or services from these
favoured groups. A government can help during
the provision of monopolistic rents, meaning
they have a certain value and the aspiration to
such rents has been named „rent seeking“.
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The term „rent seeking“ was first used to
describe these activities by Anne Krueger [15].
According to this authoress, government
restrictions exist with respect to the economic
activities of an inseparable part of life in many
market orientated economies. These restrictions
enable rents to arise in various forms and
people often compete in obtaining them with the
result that sometimes such competition is outright
illegal. In other cases rent seeking takes on
other forms, for instance bribery, corruption,
smuggling or the black market. Three types of
expenses for rent seeking can be identified
which can be socially wasteful: the efforts and
expenditures of potential beneficiaries of
a monopoly; the efforts of government officials
to obtain or influence the expenditures of
potential beneficiaries; and the deformation 
of a third party caused by the monopoly itself or
the government as a result of rent seeking.
According to Olson [22], groups of
individuals with common interests usually
endeavour to support those common interests.
From groups of individuals with common
interests we can expect such behaviour
stemming from this common interest, whereas
in the case of individuals, they are acting for the
benefit of their own interests. Group theory is
based on the idea that, if need be, a group acts
in such a way that it supports their common or
group aims. The opinion that groups act
predominantly in their interest is based on the
assumption that individuals in the group
don’t necessarily act in their own interest. If
individuals in a group altruistically ignore their
own welfare, it is highly unlikely that collectively
they will seek some selfish common or group
interest. Such altruism is, however, considered
to be exceptional and behaviour focussing on
one’s interest is usually thought to be the rule,
at least in economic matters. No one is
surprised when an entrepreneur seeks to
maximize his profits, an employee seeks higher
wages or a consumer seeks a lower price. The
idea that groups incline towards supporting
group interests is considered to be a logical
result of the broadly accepted premise of
rational, personal interest.
Individuals with common interests, e.g.
farmers in general or those with an interest in
a specific commodity, get together to form interest
groups. These interest groups incur costs as
a result of engaging in lobbying activities or rent
seeking. Lobbying activities are aimed at
encouraging the government to redistribute
revenues to their group or, in contrast, not to
remove existing transfers or allocate them to
another group. A typical example of the rent
seeking mechanism is the Common
Agricultural Policy.
In spite of the reforms carried out, EU
agricultural policy is primarily criticised for its
high costs and low efficiency. Based on
Hausner [11] the greatest beneficiaries of the
European agricultural policy are France (9.4 billion
euro), Spain (6.3 billion euro), Germany 
(6.1 billion euro) and Italy (5 billion euro).
Owing to the fixed prices policy, a large portion
of the overall expenditures must be invested in
the associated purchases, administration,
storage, export support or the destruction of the
produced goods. It is estimated that farmers
only receive about 20 % of the overall
expenditure resulting from agricultural policy.
Global market prices for agricultural products
are increased to the level of EU internal price
levels by means of administrative fixed prices.
In addition it is necessary to emphasize the
impacts that agricultural policy has on farmers’
incomes, production, or trade and, above all, on
the distribution of political rent. An important
OECD study concluded that only 20 % of all the
market and price support measures in the
OECD countries led to forming an agricultural
holding’s net profit, the rest is dispersed
elsewhere including to the owners 
of production factors [20]. Moreover, over 60 %
of support for producers is provided by means
of measures that lead to increasing the prices
of producers. This makes it more difficult to
bear for households with low incomes, for
whom food is a large part of their budget [21].
The fact that the amount of support is linked to
the size of the agricultural land area leads to
capitalisation of the land or the rent, increasing
the demand for land and thus its price. The
smallest agricultural holdings suffer the most
because as a result of the increase in the price
of land, they cannot attain the necessary
support [6]. Thus, the large agricultural
holdings get the majority of payments.
Therefore, the CAP burdens both the
European tax payer, due to its high costs, and
the consumer due to the overly high prices it
creates. From the economic point of view,
direct income support for farmers should be
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preferred over the current system, which deforms
market prices. The European agricultural lobby,
above all in France and Germany, has so far
passed very efficient measures for the effective
protection of farmers from degrading the just
beneficiaries of state subsidies.
Further decisions concerning state subsidies
and payments of state subsidies can be
highlighted. These decisions should not be
made at the EU level, but by the pertinent
Member States in accordance with their political
priorities and they should be in agreement with
the principle that requires the identity of those
making the decision, whether they are consumers
or payers, to be revealed with regard to
minimising the overall cost. In the case of
private goods the individual is responsible for
all three functions, whilst in the case of public
goods there is a large number of those who
decide, consumers and payers, who are not
necessarily identical. If payers predominate in
the decision-making process, the budget has
a tendency to be low. If consumers predominate,
the budget will be too high, because, by virtue
of not being forced to finance these measures
themselves, consumers will choose an
exorbitant offer of public goods.
In essence there is nothing inherently bad
about the fact that France and Germany allot to
agriculture a high priority. The French and
German political paradigm has a far greater
tendency to emphasise the notion that farmers
lag behind the other economic sectors [7].
Nonetheless, these national preferences
cannot be funded from EU resources.
Keeler [14] has also expressed criticism of
the fact that the CAP overly burdens the
consumers and tax payers and destroys global
markets by virtue of price distortion and export
support.
2. CAP Reforms and the Strength of
the Agricultural Lobby
The CAP fulfils three roles: a political one in
that it unifies the EU Member States in their
activities; an economic one in stabilising internal
agricultural markets and supporting sectoral
revenues in agriculture; and a redistributional
one by means of the interstate budgetary flows,
that are a consequence of the manner of
revenue payments from agriculture and the
nature of sharing the EU budgetary costs.
Attempts to reform the CAP must reconcile the
various pressures that arise from these three
roles and the result is that reforms are
extremely slow, spasmodic and unsuccessful.
In addition to these three roles, there is another,
that of preserving the landscape and the
people in it.
The pressure for reform comes primarily
from the EU budget deficit, as well as a very
small amount of pressure at present but
increasing in intensity, from international
trading partners and currently also from
environmental interests.
So how is it possible that in spite of the
costly and ineffective agricultural policy in the
EU and the swelling criticism of this policy that
there are still states that obtain and invest into
agriculture significant financial resources from
the EU budget? And why is it still so difficult to
reform agriculture?
In order to answer these questions it is
necessary to look into the history of the CAP.
Since the beginning of the 20th century,
technological changes have been a major
factor in shaping agriculture [12]. The first
political notions of a CAP were initiated by the
somewhat naive notion that agriculture needed
saving so that it could sustain sufficiently large
production units that would be able to compete
on the global market [7]. The general concept
that existed at the end of the 1960’s and others
that still represent the basic element for
politicians in the Member States with strong
mercantile tendencies, such as France, was of
a backward sector that had to be supported to
keep up with the industrial sector. Falling world
prices in agricultural products during the 1970’s
together with a decrease in job opportunities
outside agriculture and a subsequent rise in the
social rating of family farms has enabled the
gradual opening up of the path to state aid to
become a dominant principle of the CAP [23].
As Potter and Tilzey [24] wrote, the CAP
became an agricultural welfare state in which
the state gave a long-term guarantee for the
incomes of millions of farmers and their families.
Above all the high prices for agricultural
products were institutionally guaranteed and
farmers were protected from competitive
imports by import taxes and non-tariff barriers.
According to the original creators of the CAP,
the resulting system of price support and
boundary protection was to have been self-
financing because the costs for price support
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were compensated by a reimbursement
stemming from import taxes. However, these
creators did not reckon with the technological
revolution that took place in agriculture in the
60’s and 70’s, which enabled the more efficient
farmers to react to a guarantee of higher prices
by increasing production. As soon as domestic
production exceeded self-sufficiency for certain
commodities, such as grain and dairy products,
politicians discovered that the excess had to be
either stored or exported to the global markets
with the help of export subsidies. The outcome
was that the CAP was both expensive for the
domestic states (in 1985 it absorbed 70 % of
the EU budget) and increasingly controversial
abroad, by virtue of the deforming effect the
increased use of EU export subsidies had on
global market prices.
In spite of the growing costliness and
inefficiency of the agricultural policy in the EU,
the well-organised and institutionally entrenched
agricultural lobby was successful in rejecting
essential reforms to the CAP for a long time.
Despite significant political pressure, there were
surprisingly moderate changes in the general
level of agricultural supports in the 1980’s and
1990’s, thus even in 1995 the European Union
earmarked 55 % of its budget to support
agriculture. In response to the growing criticism
of the CAP, as well as its poor reputation at the
WTO and among their business partners,
politicians started to step back from price support
with the McSharry reforms in 1992. However,
whilst every successful reform package brought
lower institutional prices, they compensated
farmers with progressively increasing direct
payments.
In spite of state aid and the associated
system of support for production, the transfer of
incomes and protected borders continued and
were substantially defended by farmers and
those that represented them – above all the
agricultural lobby. The ever more influential
proponents of non-production agriculture and
the growing agribusiness started to call for
a continuation of the agricultural welfare state
and access to the international market. The
liberalisation of agricultural trade not only
opened up global markets to these interests, it
also guaranteed global supply and made the
internationalisation of production by means of
joint enterprises, direct investments in foreign
branches of factories and the emergence of
export platforms a lot easier. It is, however,
clear that the agricultural lobby still represented
an overly strong group endeavouring to suppress
liberal reforms to the agricultural policy.
Based on Dibden et al. [8] the role of the
state cannot be omitted. The basic assumption
is that in the absence of state aid, large groups
of family-run agricultural holdings are not very
resistant to economic pressures. The margina-
lisation of agriculture and the important social
and environmental impact of losing state aid led
groups of agricultural lobbyists to promote the
continuation of agricultural supports.
According to Brooks [3], recognising the
importance of the agricultural lobby offers several
ways that might make reforms in agricultural
policy more sustainable. Firstly, compensation
for price reductions can ease the path to
reform. If it would help people create a more
effective payment method in agriculture, or
outside it, the result would definitely be better
than increasing demand for protected agriculture.
Furthermore, it is important to simplify policy.
Support for market prices sounds simple, but
experience shows that a number of tools are
necessary to maintain them, for instance by
means of tariffs, tariff quotas, export subsidies
and production controls. Transparent payments
for providing identifiable public goods such as
caring for the environment or an income safety
net can have high administrative demands but
if recipients are all provided for to the same
degree, costs associated with lobbying for
special support – rent seeking – should
decrease.
It is true that in the case of the EU
agricultural policy, the agricultural lobby was
able to avoid excessive financial outlays by
virtue of their unilateral interests and exceptional
organisation. In professional articles dealing
with the CAP, the paradox that such
a „decreasing minority“ is able to develop
enough clout to receive subsidies from the CAP
at the expense of the far greater number of tax
payers and consumers is often mentioned. In
order to comprehend this mystery, we have to
look at the size of the European agricultural
lobby from a suitable perspective. This explains
why European consumers and tax payers are
less inclined to oppose agricultural subsidies
than is often assumed by economists, to realise
the asymmetry of interests between the
agricultural lobby and consumers and tax
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payers when reducing agricultural subsidies
and to acknowledge the fundamental difference
in the organisational strength between farmers
and the potential compensatory forces [14].
Keeler [14] amplifies the mentioned aspects as
follows. Despite a longstanding depopulation of
rural areas, the size of the active agricultural
population in the EU remains, under certain
conditions, sizable. In order to realize the true
weight of the agricultural lobby, it is necessary
to take into account the non-farmers and
companies with interests in agriculture.
Residents of rural areas where agriculture is the
main activity have a strong common interest in
the development of agriculture. Absentee land
owners have a vested interest in agricultural
policy, because a significant reduction in price
support would adversely affect the price of
land. Merchants, store owners and food
processors who produce agrobusiness are also
very interested in the fate of farmers.
Many people outside the EU agricultural
lobbies perceived effects of agricultural
subsidies with less hostility than critics assume.
Food price inflation corresponding CAP subsidies
is much less visible to ordinary consumers than
economists dealing with reform. Many
consumers in the EU showed a real sympathy
with the farmers because of the nature of their
work and their demographic decline.
Despite their sympathy for farmers,
consumers and taxpayers are very submissive
in an acceptance of CAP measures relating to
agricultural subsidies. The farmer’s interest to
gain the support is much higher than the
interest of consumers and taxpayers to
eliminate them.
The interests of farmers are defended by
tens of different European groups, which
together conquer the lobbying capacity of
potential countervailing interest groups such as
consumers or environmentalists (disagreements
between farm lobby and environmental lobby
are discussed e.g. in [4]). Agricultural
associations also receive their organizational
success both due to its ability to respond to
a wide range of needs and services supplied by
farmers in the form of selected stimuli.
In addition, MacLaren [17] identifies another
four factors that, to a great extent, could explain
the strong influence of the agricultural lobby:
the solidarity of the agricultural organisations;
the inter-institutional relationship between
agricultural organisations and the ministry of
agriculture, the importance government attaches
to agriculture and the status of the ministry of
agriculture in national government. MacLaren
argues that „the degree to which politicians are
captured by the farming lobby, and the extent to
which they support transparency in policy-
making, determine whether fundamental
reforms are feasible“ [17, p. 424].
3. Agriculture’s Position at the
National Level – a Case Study 
of the Czech Republic
An important part of the political heritage of the
CAP is the notion that the CAP is of paramount
importance for both farmers and the European
Community as an institution. It must be presumed
that the background in Brussels represents the
most important institutional asset for the
agricultural lobby. However, the national level of
forming the CAP is probably more important
and above all, can be influenced far more to the
benefit of the farmers. The national level
represents both the first and last line of defence
for agricultural interests. It is here that the
Member States form their political position
which is then transferred to Brussels.
However, the agricultural lobby is not the
only one to significantly influence the CAP outputs.
National governments also act disproportiona-
tely in favour of farmers. In the EU Member
States, organised agriculture has a uniquely
privileged relationship with the officials from its
ministries. In addition, in some of the key
Member States, the agricultural lobby enjoys
increased clout via the specific electoral system
or its special contacts with influential political
parties.
To understand why the CAP has not
undergone fundamental reforms, despite the
calls for which that have been made for many
years, it is necessary to identify the institutions
and interest groups in the political process and
understand the roles that each plays. The main
supranational institutions incorporated into the
CAP are the European Commission, the EU
Council and, to a lesser extent, the European
Parliament, the Council of Europe and the Court
of Justice. There are also interest groups that
operate at the national and European level that
try to influence political reform. These groups
include agricultural organisations, agri-business
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groups, consumers, the press, public opinion,
academic and political groups [18]. Of these
groups, by far the most influential are the
national; agricultural organisations (e.g. Comité
des Organisations Professionnelles Agricoles –
COPA which represents the general and
specific interests of EU farmers and as an
organisation it speaks for the entire agricultural
sector) and certain national political parties.
As mentioned above, the interest groups
are entities that attempt to represent collective
interests and influence the political process in
their sphere of competence. Their role as
mediators is crucial for institutionalising both
formal and informal standards. The activity of
interest groups is related to the specific
interest, developing pressure and influencing
political leadership so that they can provide
services to the members of the interest group.
They are not political organisations even
though they take part in political events or have
direct or indirect relations with political parties.
In so far as agriculture is concerned, their
relationships with political parties and political
connections are key because they guarantee
access, representation and participation.
Mediating interests in the EU Member
States can be demonstrated in the case of the
Czech Republic as the position of the
agricultural lobby in the Czech Republic can be
scrutinized applying similar analytical tools as
in the case of the original EU members. Czech
agriculture bears the heritage of an extensively
collectivised sector. The case study can
demonstrate the efforts of a new Member State
to modernise in the realm of professionally
mediating interests and at the same time point
out the controversial role played by agricultural
organisations in the Czech Republic.
The above text reveals in general the
strength of the agricultural lobby based on its
unity, however it is clear that the interests of
these interest groups can differ within the
individual states. As a consequence, farmers’
interests are not necessarily uniformly represented
in the political process by one lobby and there
is stiff competition between the individual
groups for political influence, which can weaken
the position of agriculture on the political scene
and slow down the necessary reforms to the
agricultural policy. An example of this is the
Czech Republic, which, in 1989, formed two
strong factions – agricultural enterprises and
family farms – with differing interests.
According to Bavorová [1], whether this sector
will behave uniformly, as is the case in the
majority of the original Member States, plays
a large role when promoting the interests of
Czech agriculture in EU agricultural policy. The
following text shows the situation during which
there is a weakening of the position of the
agricultural lobby in the Czech Republic in the
competitive fight with the other Member States
for agricultural subsidies.
During the transformation process in the
Czech Republic, new forms of ownership of the
original cooperatives and state farms were tried
out. Currently agricultural land is divided up
primarily among individuals (29 %), commercial
companies (47 %), cooperatives (22 %) and
state enterprises (0.2 %). There are two main
interest groups in Czech agriculture: the
Agricultural Association, which represents large
scale agricultural enterprises and the
Association of Private Agriculture, which
represents the interests of small private farms.
The third important organisation is the Czech
Agrarian Chamber.
The Agricultural Association of the Czech
Republic (Zemûdûlsk˘ svaz âR) was founded
in 1968 under the original title of the Association
of Agricultural Cooperatives and Companies. It
has borne its current title since 2001. The
change to the Agricultural Association resulted
in the opening up to all the large companies
that were employers, regardless of the form of
business. The fact that the Association was
founded during the socialist period, and thus
connected to the old regime, made its activities
problematic after the revolution. In order for the
Association to become politically acceptable, it
had to formally rid itself of its socialist past. In
spite of this, the association’s heads remained
convinced of the virtues of large-scale farming
as it was promoted during the socialist period.
The members’ solidarity strengthened this
jointly held conviction.
The Association of Private Agriculture
(Asociace soukromého zemûdûlství), whose
members predominantly received land after
restitution, was first established in 1999.
Considering the fact that the association arose
by unifying three associations (the Association
of Land Owners and Private Farmers, the
Association of Private Farmers and the
Association of Enterprises) there are differences
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of opinion among the members. The most
important unifying element is the common
enemy, that being the cooperatives and large-
scale agriculture. Apart from this, they share
liberal market opinions.
In 1993, Act No. 301/1992 Coll. established
the Agrarian Chamber of the Czech Republic
(Agrární komora âR) and as opposed to the
other lobbies, its didn’t come into existence on
a voluntary basis. Among its main tasks are the
following: to represent the interests of the
companies in agriculture, the food industry and
forest management, to provide a summary of
their various interests and ideas. Despite the
Agrarian Chamber’s close connection to the
state, it has not managed to merge the interests
of the two most important groups in agriculture,
i.e. the Agricultural Association and the
Association of Private Agriculture. Bavorová [1]
points out that, as such, the Agrarian Chamber
cannot fulfil its primary function of being
a mediator of interests. This means that, on the
one hand, the chamber is slowly starting to
resemble the Agricultural Association, with
which it cooperates, and, on the other, it is
simultaneously its competitor by virtue of its
similar sphere of competence and functions.
The Agricultural Association and the
Association of Private Agriculture have formed
two alternative institutional approaches for the
creation of their identity, the legitimacy of their
political activities and organising their participation
in the political process. Both groups use
differing mechanisms for their activities and
representing their interests.
The Agricultural Association, whose members
are agricultural, business and sales companies
and cooperatives and other entrepreneurs
whose activities are associated with agriculture,
is likewise an organisation of employers-
entrepreneurs in agriculture. It supports
competitiveness in agricultural production with
a corresponding price compensation. It holds
the opinion that the EU must ensure protection
for farmers and continue providing the
agricultural policy’s subsidy instruments. It also
places great emphasis on national subsidies
and support. From the economic point of view,
the Association represents the largest section
of Czech agriculture.
In contrast, the Association of Private
Agriculture is an organisation of private farmers
whose activities stem from rural traditions and
a who hold a conviction about the importance of
family farms as the basis of modern European
farming as well as recognizes the necessity of
the preservation of the countryside. It monitors
the economic independence of the countryside
and its development on the basis of multifunctional
agriculture. Due to its „non-marketable“ effect
the Association doesn’t represent the majority of
independent individual farmers and family farms.
The Agricultural Association and the
Association of Private Agriculture portray the
farmer as a businessman and modern
entrepreneur who fits into the global idea of the
role competitive agriculture should play in the
liberal economy of the Czech Republic.
As the largest domestic, non-government
agricultural organisation, the Agrarian Chamber
focuses on organising and unifying the entire
agricultural profession. It is engaged in the
administration, registration and collection of
statistics, and the training and regulation of
agricultural activities. It represents the interests
of its 103,000 members, who are primarily
made up of enterprises that came into existence
after the transformation of the cooperatives or
after the privatisation of the state farms. The
chamber should represent the entire agrarian
sector at the EU level in a unified platform.
However, the situation changed in 1999 when
the Agrarian Chamber split. According to the
private farmers the Agrarian Chamber did not
sufficiently defend their interests, so first the
Association of Private Agriculture split off, soon
to be followed by the Federation of the Food
and Drink Industries of the Czech Republic, for
the same reasons. Thus the Chamber could not
assume the role of the only representative of
farmers’ interests in the Czech Republic. In
spite of this however, its position as a mediator
between farmers and the state is still exclusive.
Whilst the Agricultural Association is the
most influential member of the Agrarian
Chamber and the ideas and positions of both
organisations are essentially identical, the
Association of Private Agriculture decided to
part from the company on agricultural policy, to
adopt a marginally conservative strategy and to
alter its opinions in favour of a rural development
policy. Currently it has accepted the new
European model of agriculture.
The principle difference between the
members of the Agricultural Association and
the Agrarian Chamber from the political aspect
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is that the Agrarian Chamber tends towards the
left and the Association is closer to the values
of entrepreneurial freedom and exhibits a more
conservative outlook on life, i.e. more towards
the right [25].
Agricultural organisations in the Czech
Republic are very closely linked to political
parties and can thus carry out their lobbying
successfully. From the standpoint of European
farmers and foreign experts, however, Czech
agriculture is characterised by absolute disunity
of opinion in its external presentations. Not
even the majority of the inhabitants of the
Czech Republic know that the country’s
agriculture has two utterly different faces with
different concepts of business, ownership and
the approach to the environment. The problems
of the agricultural sector and the entrepreneurs
within it are usually connected to the opinions
of the Agrarian Chamber, owing to the media,
which unequivocally prefers the Agrarian
Chamber itself, which in turn tries to act as the
spokesperson for a fully homogenous community
of entrepreneurs in agriculture, forestry and the
food industry.
However, there are two competing organi-
sations here, these being the Agrarian Chamber,
or the Agricultural Association, and the
Association of Private Agriculture. Thus, it is
becoming evident that it depends on domestic
conditions, which are often more important in
forming the structure and activities of the interest
groups rather than the effect of international or
union networks, because the domestic context
is able to convert external ideas into domestic
convictions, identity and interests.
The consequences of fragmented agricultural
lobby in the Czech Republic feel especially
family farms which due to their small organi-
zation have less ability to enforce. In contrast,
organization of large agricultural companies is
larger due to their small number, which is also
associated with an earlier period of their
establishment. Given the interconnectedness
of the Agricultural Association with the Agrarian
Chamber, interests of the Czech agriculture are
dominated by strong agricultural lobby of large
agricultural cooperatives in the long term. They
have been mainly trying to balance financial
resources coming from the EU to the old and
new EU member states as the old EU member
states receive more money for the present.
Thus, they support especially an increasing of
direct payments to agriculture at the expense of
subsidies to the diversification of agricultural
activities that are important just for family farms.
Conclusion
The political nature of agricultural support is
repeatedly confirmed (e.g. [9]) and in this
context political intervention is considered
a form of failure despite the failure being
explicable as the result of selfish motivation on
the part of political groups and bureaucracy. An
opposing view to this problem is offered by
Harvey [10], who proposes that agricultural
support be considered as the evolutionary answer
to the changing socioeconomic environment
and the political climate as the most suitable
adaptation to these conditions.
From the mid 1980’s onwards, it has
become clear that there must be changes made
to agricultural policy, above all by a weakening
of the clout of the policy within the overall
political system. The agricultural strength in the
EU has, however, remained sufficiently high to
determine the tempo and extent of reforms to
the CAP. As a result they do not attain the full
level of efforts necessary to bring about liberal
reforms. An example of this is the relationship
of the agricultural lobby to multifunctional
agriculture and the European model of
agriculture. In the European Union there have
been many debates on multifunctional agricul-
ture, which concerned the relationship between
neoliberalism, restructuring and a sustainable
environment in the European countryside.
Despite the frequent rejection of the European
model of agriculture, primarily by the
international trading partners, Potter and Tilzey
[24] argue that this model expresses a true
form of resistance to neoliberalism that
attempts to put forward the concept of the
countryside as a „working countryside“ conditional
upon the combining of the joint production of
farmers, biodiversity and rural municipalities.
This broad interpretation of multifunctionality is
difficult to understand for the persistently strong
agricultural lobby, which is able to use this idea
to justify the introduction of politically
ambiguous and internationally controversial
measures – such as the single payments
scheme within the recent CAP reforms.
For these reasons it is important to realise
the basis of the strength of interest groups in
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agriculture. The strong position of the lobby,
and agricultural lobbies, is primarily based on
the unity and the unilateral nature of their
interests, their excellent organisation when
promoting these interests, the existence of
relatively small and homogenous groups, their
ability to gain the sympathy of politicians,
consumers and tax payers and, last but not
least, their ability to emphasize the fact that
agriculture plays an indispensible role in the
society as well as at the national and
supranational economy.
The political and institutional bases of
agriculture’s strong position in Europe are, from
the collective standpoint, truly imposing.
Currently significant, if limited, liberal reforms to
the European agricultural policy are under way
and efforts to reduce farmers’ power in the EU
are being pursued so that the CAP reforms can
attain a more liberal form. The traditional
asymmetry of the CAP’s influence has changed
to the detriment of the agricultural lobbies. The
internal and external changes of the political
environment in which the CAP is formed are
generating compensatory forces, which, in
contrast to the consumers and tax payers, are
motivated to spur on farmers in the expectation
of a more considerable profit that can be gained
from the agricultural reforms.
So what can we expect from the agricultural
lobbies in the future? Although their position
seems unshakeable and despite the fact that
empirical research would be necessary, there
are several factors that inevitably weaken their
power. This concerns the continual fall in the
number of farmers and agricultural workers.
Also the institutional changes at the level of the
union can play a role in undermining farmers’
powers. Whilst the EU expansion has
strengthened defenders of the CAP in the
short-run, thanks to the high subsidies that the
farmers in the new Member States are
receiving, the future incorporation of other
countries can strengthen the change in the
traditional concept of the policy. In exceptional
cases (see that of the Czech Republic) the
disunity of the agricultural lobbyists’ interests in
the given state can weaken the position of
farmers on the political scene.
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Abstract
WHY IS THE AGRICULTURAL LOBBY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER
STATES SO EFFECTIVE?
Zuzana Bednafiíková, Jifiina Jílková
This paper tries to answer the question ‘what is the power of the agricultural lobby, as the interest
group which causes that EU member states continue to invest in a costly and ineffective
agricultural policy. Mediating interests in the EU Member States, as demonstrated in the case of
the Czech Republic, are discussed. Czech agriculture bears the heritage of an extensively
collectivised sector. The case study demonstrates the efforts of a new Member State to modernise
in the area of professionally mediated interests while at the same time the controversial role of
agricultural organisations in the competitive fight for agricultural subsidies. The strong position of
the lobby, and agricultural lobbies, is primarily based on the unity and the unilateral nature of their
interests, the excellent organisation when promoting these interests, the ability to gain the
sympathy of politicians, consumers and tax payers, the existence of relatively small and
homogenous groups and, last but not least, their abilities at pointing out the fact that agriculture
has an irreplaceable role in society and the national and international economy. The liberalisation
of agriculture depends on a successful fall in the importance and voter strength of the agricultural
sector and its sympathisers and a balancing of its natural political advantages. Strong elements
supporting the liberalisation of agriculture are also sustainable development and modernisation of
the agricultural sector and the sustainable economic development, distancing itself from
agricultural roots. Generally, it is evident that because of the liberal, even if limited, reforms of the
European agricultural policy, the weakening of the agricultural lobby power can be expected.
Key Words: agricultural lobby, interest group, rent seeking, Agrarian Chamber of the Czech
Republic.
JEL Classification: D72, Q18.
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